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This study provides a history of the introduction and use of standard costing (SC) throughout 
the home and international operations of J&P Coats Ltd, the large, British-based multinational 
thread combine, between 1925 and 1961. We interpret this history through the lens of 
institutional theory as applied to the introduction and operation of management accounting 
(MA) systems in organisations, as formulated in key studies by Burns and Scapens (2000) and 
ter Bogt and Scapens (2014). 
  
The Coats combine, formed from the Coats, Clarks, Brooks and Chadwicks firms in 1896, had 
fully centralised the control of its international operations, cash flows and investments in its 
Glasgow headquarters, which would prove to be a cornerstone of its future success 
(Kininmonth and McKinstry 2007). The account which follows of the introduction and 
operation of SC at Coats emphasises the timings, practicalities and business motivation relating 
to its implementation, which gave the firm full mastery of cost management in all its plants 
across the 1930s, through the war years and into the 1960s. 
 
In contrast with these details, we adopt an institutional approach to interpreting the effects of 
certain social, political and cultural forces (which we identify below as ‘institutions’) acting 
inside and outside the firm. This approach helps to explain, inter alia, why the SC system at 
Coats was first developed, in isolation, in its US operation from 1925 in spite of an initial lack 
of support at Head Office.  Moreover, why it went on to be implemented successfully across 
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the group whilst achieving unplanned but desirable ends. The study demonstrates that the 
institutional view is capable of providing extra analytical insights for historians. 
 
We also contribute to the literature on the introduction of SC in the UK, as summarised by 
Boyns and Edwards (2007, 2013). These authors have synthesised what is known of the devel-
opment of SC and budgetary control in the UK. They chart current understandings concerning 
its chronological development, listing twelve firms that are known to have adopted SC in some 
form up to 1942-43, nine of these introducing it prior to 1932, the year it began to be installed 
in Coats’ UK plants. The first three known firms to bring in SC were in the chemical sector, 
British Xylonite (1880s), Albright and Wilson (1890s for total costs, 1924 for labour) and Brit-
ish Dyestuffs (1922). The next five firms (up to 1930) were in metals or engineering, with J 
Lyons, in the food trade, installing SC in 1932 (Boyns and Edwards 2013). 
 
Boyns and Edwards (2013, 290/1) observe that ‘standard costing and budgetary control… had 
become far more commonplace by the late-1960s than it had been in 1945’. On the question of 
whether the USA or the UK had been first, or quicker, to install SC and budgetary control, or 
whether the one had influenced the other, they take a noncommittal approach stating that ‘it 
would be surprising if there were no important variations in the historical development of ac-
counting in the two countries’ (ibid, 271). The present study locates J&P Coats precisely in the 
above chronology and reflect on what it reveals about the interaction between Britain and the 
USA in the development of SC. It also examines the Coats case to explore further aspects of 
the history of SC, differences in practice across firms and also differences of viewpoint on 
practice, with reference to sources surveyed by Boyns and Edwards (2007, 2013), notably 
Chatfield, (1977); (Locke, 1979); Blyth, (1923); Edwards (1937); ICAEW, (1947); Brown, 
(1949); Jones, (1985); Chandler, (1977). 
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 We end the study in 1961 when Coats merged with the smaller Patons and Baldwins Ltd., 
another UK-based textile combine. After the merger, the enlarged firm, no longer family-
dominated, embarked on a long-term programme of diversification within the textile industry 
very different to the previous thread-focused strategy of Coats (Coats 2013).  
 
The study proceeds with a review of key literature, including a summary of research resources. 
Next the background of J&P Coats is provided followed by a short history of management 
change within the company, up to the point of the implementation of SC. We the present the 
surviving evidence on the installation of SC, followed by an evaluation of the usefulness of SC 
at Coats up to 1961. An institutional interpretation of the introduction of SC at Coats follows.  
We conclude with insights drawn from the Coats case to what is known about the introduction 
of SC more generally.  
 
Review of literature and other research resources 
 
Archival and other primary sources 
 
The J & P Coats’ archives at Glasgow University (UGD199) are voluminous, with a headline 
listing covering some twenty pages and a detailed listing running to hundreds of pages. A large 
proportion of what survives represents long but incomplete runs of books from what was once 
a detailed double-entry system of financial accounts. Of more use for this study are surviving 
minute books for the Board and committees, together with letter books and correspondence 
from 1868-1987. What is available provides some context for the firms’ financial operations and MA.  
 
As is often the case, Coats’ costing system and SC records per se, have failed to survive in their entirety 
within the company’s archives, given the constantly moving nature of costs, which are only useful over 
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the short-term (McKinstry 2009). However, some Board Minutes, (UGD199/1/1/5) Finance Committee 
Minutes (UGD199/1/1/24) and a Budget Installation Account which record details of the SC installation 
process (UGD199/1/8/11), as well as a SC training manual from 1962 remain, revealing little change in 
principle from the system that was implemented from 1925 onwards (UGD199, 1/26/7). 
  
We have also consulted the papers of Willie Mathieson (1905-1996), held in a private 
collection. Mathieson was a senior Coats financial executive who worked for the firm from 
1918 to 1965. He was involved in the introduction of SC in the early 1930s and rose to 
become (later in his career) the senior executive in charge of SC internationally. His papers 
include pro-forma costing forms, a few of these dating back to the 1940s with the rest 
undated (Mathieson 1).  Another undated set of forms contains instructions for the allocation 
and apportionment of overheads (Mathieson 2), deployed in the creation of SC at Coats. In 
addition to these resources, we utilise notes taken from conversations with Mathieson late in 
life with Ken Mathieson, one of the authors (Mathieson 3).  
 
An unpublished history of Coats (nd), archived at Glasgow University Business Archives, was 
commissioned by the firm from Jock Hunter, a lecturer in economics at Glasgow University.  
It was withdrawn at the draft stage on grounds of the sensitivity of the information it revealed 
(ex inf Brian Coats 2017). This history draws heavily on interviews with Coats senior staff, 
including Willie Mathieson and directors whose age and length of service with the company 
straddled the dates when SC was introduced and utilised at the firm. The interviews are thus an 
invaluable source on SC’s progress as well as a prime source on the company’s development. 
 




Blair’s book on the Paisley thread industry (1907) remains a useful summary of the rise of Coats and 
Clarks, out of which J&P Coats Ltd. had been formed in 1896. A detailed study of Coats’ initial 
growth in Paisley from 1830-83 (Cairncross and Hunter 1987) analyses key financial statistics 
from Coats’ early phase.  Kininmonth (2006) describes in detail Coats’ committee system of 
management from the 1890s to the 1960s.  Coats’ tight central financial and treasury control 
of its multinational operations from Glasgow, one of the great secrets of its steady success, is 
detailed in Kininmonth and McKinstry (2007).  However this paper touched on, but did not 
fully analyse Coats’ MA systems, which only reached their potential for tight financial control 
at the plant level with the advent of SC.   
 
Of contextual relevance are studies by Kim of the changing role of the Coats family in the 
business (Kim 1994), of Coats operations and their fate in Tsarist Russia (Kim 1995), of Coats 
as a multinational before 1914 (Kim 1997) and of Coats in its two main US plants before 1914 
(Kim 1997).  None of these studies focuses on the firm’s financial systems. Fleming, 
McKinstry and Wallace (2000) analyses the development of MA in the West of Scotland from 
1900-1960, noting the struggle of Coats to find SC expertise in the local area in the early 1930s, 
but does not investigate the detailed process of installation across the firm. 
 
A new and widely researched general history of Coats (2013) has been written by the direct descendant 
of James Coats, the firm’s founder in the early-nineteenth century, its author also being the last family 
member to work in the firm. It begins with the early origins of the thread business in Paisley, tracing 
the firm’s progress until its recent history as a multinational with few manufacturing interests remaining 




By focusing on the implementation and operation of SC at Coats, the present study fills an 
important gap in an understanding of how the firm came to be financially robust not just across, 
but within its plants. As we outline SC became another factor in Coats’ sustained success. 
 
The institutional approach to the introduction of new management accounting systems 
 
As an analytical frame of reference, we have chosen the approach advocated by Burns and 
Scapens in their seminal 2000 paper, ‘Conceptualising management accounting change: an in-
stitutional framework’. Burns and Scapens begin their analysis outlining the three main re-
search trajectories in the field of organisational studies related to institutions (Miller 1994; 
Scott 1995; Scapens 2006), namely, new institutional economics (Walker 1998), new institu-
tional sociology (Carruthers 1995), and old institutional economics (Veblen 1898, Hodgson 
2006). The broad premise of these approaches is that societies are characterised by ‘institu-
tions’, in the sense of constellations of beliefs, practices, rules, both formal (as in the law) and 
informal, (as in particular cultures) which bind societies together and can influence their de-
velopment at the organisational level (Scott 1995). 
 
New institutional economics extends the study of economics by focusing on social and legal 
norms and relationships, analysing the firm and its costs, including those involved in promoting 
agreements with internal and outside providers of goods and services (‘transaction costs’). The 
second of these approaches, new institutional sociology, studies how the external environment, 
with its institutions consisting of rules, beliefs and traditions, affects the behaviour of organi-
sations in their quest for legitimacy. Through isomorphism this conduct leads to organisations 
developing compatibility with environmental characteristics.  
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The third approach, old institutional economics, is favoured by Burns and Scapens (2000) for 
a new understanding of MA innovation. It looks upon institutions within organisations as sub-
stantially affecting their decision making and progress. For this purpose, Burns and Scapens 
define an institution as ‘a way of thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, which 
is embedded in the habits of a group’ (2000, 5) and which includes established ‘rules’ and 
‘ways of doing things’. They stress ‘the importance of organisational routines in shaping the 
process of management accounting change’ (2000, 3) in the sense that new systems may take 
on approaches and features embedded in existing systems. Conversely, new organisational 
rules, such as new MA systems, once adopted, alter the nature of the organisation thereafter, 
so that it is probable that future organisational changes respond reflexively to the routines and 
systems of the organisation thus altered.  
 
Burns and Scapens also state that it is likely ‘that management accounting change which is 
consistent with the existing routines and institutions [in a firm] will be easier to achieve than 
change which challenges those routines and institutions’ (2000, 12). The value of these insights 
is that they can be used for ‘interpretive case studies of management accounting change’ (2000, 
9). Burns and Scapens further note that the research in such cases ‘needs to be longitudinal in 
nature…to locate the processes of management accounting change in institutional time and 
space’ (2000, 23). 
 
Vailatti, da Silva Rosa and Vicente (2017) set out to examine the use of institutional theory in 
relation to MA practices in the academic literature, analysing articles which appeared in major 
international accounting journals over the period 2006 to 2015. Of the 21 studies analysed, 
there were no studies of MA using the new institutional economics, but 81 per cent used new 
9 
 
institutional sociology, which, as noted, is primarily concerned with the effects of exogenous 
institutional factors on the firm.  
 
Four studies used old institutional economics, with its focus on institutional factors within the 
firm, each adopting Burns and Scapens (2000) as their theoretical point of reference.  As 
Vailatti, da Silva Rosa and Vicente (2017) note in these four studies ‘the process of institution-
alisation proposed by Burns and Scapens (2000) can explain the factors for the implementation 
for new processes or tools in … organisations’ (103). The four studies explore the nature of 
‘routines’ generally (Quinn 2011), social accounting implementation (Arroyo 2012), balanced 
scorecard implementation (Quesado 2013) and the introduction of an extranet (Youssef 2013). 
As none of them were long-term studies, the relevance of our own analysis of J&P Coats re-
mains for purposes of giving a longer institutional analysis, not hitherto undertaken. 
 
Also of relevance to our study is ‘Institutions, Rationality and Agency in Management Ac-
counting: Rethinking and Extending the Burns and Scapens Framework’, by ter Bogt and 
Scapens (2014). In their work, ter Bogt and Scapens extend the 2000 framework in order to 
accommodate the effects of external institutions, as well as internal institutions, on organisa-
tions and point out that the former can help explain different types of rationality (‘situated 
logics’)  that are employed in the process of MA change. The authors point out that these up-
dates were already ‘implicit within’ the earlier Burns and Scapens framework (2014, 28).  For 
example, their definition of an institution as ‘a way of thought or action … embedded in the 
habits of a group’ (2000, 5) is sufficiently wide to encompass institutions which originate ex-




Based on a short, comparative, study of the Accounting and Finance staff research monitoring 
systems in Groningen and Manchester Universities, ter Bogt and Scapens demonstrate that it 
was useful to study higher education MA systems as they were affected by both external and 
internal institutional influences, as the former can influence the latter. Initial scrutiny of the 
available archival and literature resources suggests that evidence exists to support the influence 
of both internal and external institutions at Coats. We thus have adopted this more comprehen-
sive approach for our own study of SC within the firm.  
 
This research not only examines the relationship between external institutions and internal SC 
practices and attitudes as the latter became institutionalised, but also how these reflexively 
affected the organisation’s subsequent development. The study will also test the degree to 
which the success of the Coats SC system reflected its consistency with existing routines and 
institutions, as Burns and Scapens (2000) suggest. 
 
Institutional theory, while it has succeeded in becoming ‘the dominant theory to study macro-
organisational phenomena’ (Suddaby 2010, 14), is not without its difficulties. In spite of its 
prevalence, there is not as yet an agreed definition of ‘what an institution actually is’ (Peters 
2000, 11) or how such phenomena can be measured. It remains incumbent on scholars to dis-
cern and justify the existence of institutions from the available evidence, which will be seen as 
the study unfolds.  
 
Concern has also been expressed (Suddaby 2010) that the exclusive use of institutional theory 
in organisational studies may result in the omission from analysis of ‘the variety and complex-
ity of the empirical world of organisations’ or how ’institutions operate through the influence 
and agency of individuals’. To counter this, Suddaby notes that a need exists to return to ‘rich 
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case studies’ (Suddaby 2010, 14-17). In this regard, his concerns are aligned with the call of 
Burns and Scapens, noted earlier, for ‘interpretive case studies of management accounting 
change’ that should be ‘longitudinal in nature’ (2000, 9). Our study meets these requirements, 
attending to the roles of key individuals, operating in a context of corporate, multinational 
complexity over a long period of time, while also examining the institutional dimension. 
 
Coats: background and organisational history 
 
J & P Coats Ltd. was the world’s third largest company by capital raised in 1912 (Schmitz 
1995), with sewing thread plants on most continents and at that point, still growing. Its first 
and largest production centres were its two complexes in Paisley, the Ferguslie and Anchor 
Mills, the factories of its two predecessor family firms, J&P Coats and J&J Clark. These firms, 
both of which had long had a manufacturing presence in the USA, had merged in 1896 into a 
single company whose shares were traded on the London Stock Exchange.  At this time two 
English thread producers, Chadwicks and Brooks, which had previously been party to an 
agreement with Coats to align prices in order to eliminate competition, were also acquired. The 
firm relocated to a new Head Office in Glasgow, from which it steadily expanded through the 
acquisition of thread-producing factories throughout the rest of the world, some by outright 
purchase, some by majority shareholding, into the 1930s and beyond, by which stage it would 
come to employ some 37,000 staff across 51 mills in 25 countries (Hunter nd; Kininmonth and 
McKinstry 2007). 
  
Coats’ overseas expansion, from the middle years of the nineteenth century, was designed to 
overcome tariff barriers. Having established itself in a country for this purpose, it was 
determined to control key activities from the centre. Selling and associated pricing co-
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ordination led to the creation of The Central Agency (TCA), in 1896 by the German Ernst Otto 
Philippi, hired earlier by Coats and who had been given a free hand in organising the company. 
TCA’s central pricing resulted in plants in different countries focusing on overcoming local 
competitors, rather than competing with each other (Hunter nd).  
 
From the 1890s, activities were co-ordinated through a system of Head Office committees, 
staffed by directors and senior managers of central functions. A Finance Committee, a Cotton 
Buying Committee and a Yarn Buying Committee were started in the 1890s and all three 
committees were still in place in 1961. A General Purposes Committee, also set up in the 1890s, 
co-ordinated everything else and it too was still operating in 1961. (Kininmonth and McKinstry 
2007, Figure 2). The four committees, inaugurated by the autocratic Philippi, made Coats a 
powerful bureaucracy controlled from Glasgow.  
 
After World War One, the Nevsky mills in Russia, owned since 1890, were expropriated by 
the Bolshevik government.  Philippi died in 1922, leaving a huge managerial hole to be filled. 
The many plants bought during the Edwardian period in Europe (France, Germany, Italy, 
Switzerland, and Hungary) required increased attention during the 1920s along with plants in 
Brazil, Canada, Japan and two plants in the USA to scrutinise. By the late 1920s, there were in 
also many new firms in Central Europe in which Coats planned to acquire an interest. By this 
time the control system of four central committees plus the Board was overworked and 
struggling (Hunter nd). 
 
As the older generation of family directors came to be replaced by the next generation and also 
by non-family directors throughout the 1920s, pressures came for decentralised power. The 
two large US plants, still run under the Clarks and Coats names by family descendants, had, 
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required to be ceded considerable independence as a result of US antitrust laws and were setting 
their own selling prices. Indeed, in 1925 the US division unilaterally decided to introduce SC 
to its operations, of which no mention in the minutes of the hard-pressed Glasgow Board for 
this period has been found. Powerful and able new leaders were also emerging in Europe, 
including former family members of firms taken over and ex-Glasgow-trainees such as James 
Henderson of Cucurini Cantoni Coats in Italy. In order to sell Coats brands, as well as price 
and sell locally branded goods, they required a certain measure of autonomy. To these 
individuals may be added C H MacKenzie, a Cambridge economics graduate, trained under 
John Maynard Keynes, recruited to TCA in 1922. He went on to become the priority board 
director most in favour of SC (Hunter nd). 
 
A historical emphasis on product quality and uniform manufacturing methods was always 
rigorously exported to overseas mills. Hunter concluded that ‘tradition and training bred senior 
executives whose outlook was essentially that of very skilled mechanics rather than that of 
entrepreneurs’, which was limiting Coats (Hunter nd, 21).  
 
The new management system of 1931 
 
The firm’s response to these organisational challenges was to create a grouping of its 
companies into five divisions.  Division 1 brought together the two Paisley mills and the two 
English mills as United Thread Mills while Division 2 consisted of South American businesses 
and other wholly owned European plants. Division 3 (Central European plants) had a local 
Executive Committee in Vienna. The US Division 4 consisted of plants in the USA and Canada, 
its pricing and selling already done through the New York Office of the Spool Cotton 
Company. Division 5 consisted of plants in Spain, Belgium, Japan and other foreign associated 
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companies. Each group was supervised by its own Liaison Committee in Glasgow.  The 
decision was made to devolve aspects of the management of the company, but the plants 
remained under the supervision of Glasgow through the Liaison Committees (Hunter nd). 
 
The other part of the 1931 reorganisation was to raise the number of committees from four to 
some 22. This system consisted of six senior committees intended to benefit the entire combine, 
Selling, United Thread Mills, Yarn and Cotton Buying, Manufacturing, Research and 
Development; and Finance. Together, the six senior committees were supported in their work 
by 16 sub-committees (Hunter nd).  
 
Hunter concludes that the new system’s purpose ‘was to allocate responsibility as clearly as 
possible to the men who in fact made decisions, and to clear the feet of directors and senior 
executives of what were essentially routine matters’. In addition, he states that the committees 
were to be staffed by senior members of the selling, manufacturing and finance functions at 
Head Office ‘hitherto very largely separate’ (Hunter nd, 34), indicating a matrix approach 
designed to produce more informed decision making. Kininmonth (2008) has concluded that 
the system appeared to have kept substantial decision making away from the Board, but that a 
minority of the decisions could have been made by subordinates.  
 
Directors from the founding family members, Coats, Clarks, Brooks and Chadwicks, continued 
to attend the central committees.  Up to the 1930s, they were numerically dominant, indicating 
a tension between a desire to delegate away from the Board but at the same time to retain family 
control. An expenditure limit of £3000 applied to the committees, except for the Manufacturing 
Committee, whose limit was £20,000, above which, the Board had to decide. In the 
comparatively devolved US plants, a limit of $100,000 applied, beyond which Glasgow’s 
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approval was required. The new management system of 1931 thus held centralised power and 
delegation in a delicate balance. It was still in operation up to the end of the period of study 
(Kininmonth 2008). 
 
The introduction of SC throughout Coats 
 
SC at Coats had been introduced in its more independent US operations in 1925. The 
consultants employed were Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison (SJH), a New York-based firm 
which provided ‘services in labour and production cost planning’ (Ferguson 2002, 76). SC was 
at that time ‘almost completely unknown in the UK’ (Hunter nd, 38). It was not until the late 
1920s that the Board at Head Office in Glasgow decided that concerns about the company's 
cost accounting system should take the rest of the group in that direction.  
 
While events in the USA took their own course, of which little trace remains, Hunter (nd) points 
out that there were financial control concerns in Glasgow. Little consciousness existed at Head 
Office of the different financial dynamics at Coats’ increasingly numerous overseas subsidiary 
mills, some of which arose because of transfer payments, designed in some cases to avoid local 
taxation. In addition, the variety of business circumstances applying to each, together with a 
lack of financial analysis in Glasgow, meant that the secrets of the combine’s success were not 
fully understood at Head Office. The lack of financial analysis had not been seen as a great 
problem, given the firm’s steady profitability. However, the company’s auditors, Thomson 
McLintock & Co, per John Duncan, were asked to report to the Board on ‘our Cost Section’. 
Duncan produced a preliminary report on 13 March, 1929, followed by a final report on 8 May 




Duncan concluded that there was a lack of reconciliation of raw materials produced and 
consumed within the system, a considerable problem, as the raw material costs of making and 
processing thread were far and away the largest cost element. Nor was there a mechanism for 
notifying cost departments of ‘changes in working conditions and prices at the mills’, a 
comment relating to the firm’s output-based wage rates. Additionally ‘the complex question of 
exchange rates’ which was not, apparently, being handled well in cost calculations. The 
lateness of the availability of accurate average costs for stock valuation calculations was also 
becoming an obstacle (UGD199, 1/1/5).  
 
On considering the report, the Board decided to look into ‘the question of standard costs’, with  
Duncan asked to advise on specialists in the field who might be able to help Coats (UGD199, 
1/1/5, 12 June,1930). It seems that there was little detailed knowledge in Glasgow of SC in the 
USA and that there was no link to US consultants. 
 
Later in 1930, it became clear that Duncan had recommended Thomas Downie Junior, CA, 
who was a partner in the Glasgow firm Harrison, Downie & Inglis. Downie was the author of 
what Boyns and Edwards (2013) identify as the first book written in the UK specialising in SC 
(Downie 1927).  Only three copies are known to exist in the UK (ex inf T Boyns), suggesting 
it attracted few sales and little interest. After explaining the principles of the system, Downie's 
book contained several fully worked examples of SC, which he saw as a counterpart to rational 
production systems, making complimentary passing reference to FW Taylor, the US pioneer 
of ‘scientific management’. Downie saw SC as a means of highlighting inefficiencies through 
the analysis of variances. In the preface to his book, he notes that he had studied several systems 
in operation (Downie 1927), almost certainly in the USA, where he spent two years in the mid-
1920s (ex inf Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, November, 2017). 
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By January 1931, Downie had been engaged by the Board to begin the installation of SC at 
Coats’ Eagley Thread Mills, near Bolton (UGD199/1/1/5). Downie’s report of 21 January 
examined some of the practicalities of choosing dates for standard setting and bases for the 
apportionment of ‘oncost’. At a Board meeting at around the same time, it was decided that the 
new SC should be set assuming a high level of efficiency and that quarterly reporting of costs 
was appropriate as the firm already had a quarterly financial reporting system. Communications 
with the US operations were planned to talk about stock policy in relation to SC, showing that 
the USA experience was being utilised. 
 
On 11 March 1931, the decision was made at the Board meeting to create a Sub-Committee to 
oversee the introduction of SC across the group, when Downie’s appointment as auditor of 
Coats’ UK Mills was also confirmed (UGD199/1/1/5).  From July 1931, the activities of the 
SC Cub-Committee, are recorded in the Finance Committee Minutes (UGD199/1/1/24). In 
January 1932, a ‘Mr Case’ of SJH was advising on Division 4’s SC at the company’s New 
Jersey and Providence Mills in the USA, informing Glasgow of how it had set up the standards 
earlier in the USA.  SJH had opened up an office in London in 1930 with no known connection 
to Coats.  
  
At this time, SJH did not include any work study, that is, the calculation of times for the various 
labour operations in the mills, as a basis for its analysis, this service being supplied at Coats by 
Stevens and Company of Boston, described in a minute of 11 April 1932 as ‘experts from the 
USA’.  A minute of 9 May 1932 records that JC Clark, the chairman of Coats, was to be in 
charge of the introduction of SC. Mr Parker of Stevens was to report to the Coats 
Manufacturing Committee with Mr Case of SJH reporting to the Finance Committee (UGD199, 
1/1/24). A minute of 17 April 1933 reveals the schedule for the installation of SC across large 
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parts of the Coats Group, which had been divided up into five divisions as part of the 1931 
reorganisation: 
 
1933-34  Division 1 (UK Plants) 
1934         Division 2 (Canada, South America and other wholly owned plants throughout 
Europe) 
1935       Division 3 (Central European plants)  
1936      Division 5 (Spain, Belgium, Japan and other foreign associated companies) 
 
No mention was made in the schedule of the US Division 4 (the Coats plants in the USA and 
Canada), as SC was already in operation there.  However, the role of Mr Case was to drop to 
‘consultant’ in December 1933, suggesting good progress (UGD199, 1/1/24). 
 
The system, in outline, consisted of the preparation of SC for products, principally sewing 
thread. The most common production processes were: Spinning; Twisting; Mercerising (a 
process which added a sheen to the thread); Bleaching; Dyeing; Hankwinding; and Polishing 
(Mathieson 1). Only three of these processes were required for standard white thread, with a 
fourth (dyeing) required for coloured or black thread. Costing, in pence per pound of yarn, 
consisted of providing a labour cost by multiplying the relevant standard operation times by 
the standard wage rates. ‘Oncost’ (overhead) was added, based on labour cost multiplied by 
appropriate overhead recovery rates, allocated and apportioned to each process, with additions 
for ‘drugs’, or chemicals, such as bleach or dyes. To this figure was added the standard yarn 
cost. Allowances for wastage at each stage were included in the standards (UGD199, 1/26/7). 
The manufacturing system, while large-scale, would not appear to have represented any 
particular difficulties for SC, with its small number of basic processes. However, there were 
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some 2300 products on sale across the group, 5000 colour shades were offered and 50,000 
possible specifications (Hunter nd,). The costs were to be prepared quarterly. 
 
Product costs, forwarded by the mills to TCA and selling committees, would come to be used 
to help establish selling prices. They were also used at the mills to calculate the standard and 
actual costs of sales every six months, for profit calculation in Glasgow. Actual stock values, 
raised from SC to actual cost at the mills, were provided once a year to Head Office, for annual 
accounts purposes. The mill cost departments also provided reports on variances to mill 
management, with wages details weekly and others quarterly. Managers were expected to 
explain and reduce excess expenditure where under their control. These reports covered labour, 
stores, drugs and other expenses. The mill cost departments (which employed some 50 to 60 
staff in each of the Paisley mills) also utilised SC in financial forecasts and in capital 
expenditure proposals (UGD199, 1/26/7). The Costing Section at the Glasgow Head Office 
(employing some 10 staff) became closely involved in the installation of SC across the Group, 
as will be seen later, operating together with mill cost staff and in conjunction with the US 
consultants employed to help up to the late-1930s. In due course the Coats Head Office 
department became highly skilled in the new SC system, leading to its installation in all mills 
newly acquired by the Group. 
 
A special account was maintained in Coats’ General Ledger to tally the costs of installing SC 
from 1932 onwards. It records the names of several individuals claiming travelling expenses 
for trips to Eagley and Meltham Mills, as well as for trips to mills in Spain and South America. 
In this account are claims by staff for Spanish language classes for those installing SC in the 
Coats mills there.  By late 1933, SC was in various stages of completion in the two huge Paisley 
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plants and at Eagley and Meltham Mills as a blend of consultants and Coats staff introduced 
the new technique together (UGD199, 1/8/11). 
 
There were difficulties with Mr Downie’s contract to instal SC as a result of his position as 
auditor of the home mills given a potential conflict of interest between his installation of 
internal systems and his auditing role (UGD199, 1/1/24). After discussions between Mr 
MacKenzie, director, and Ian Bolton, a leading Scottish CA, it was decided that he would 
withdraw from cost installation. Willie Mathieson (Mathieson 3) recalled that the Glasgow 
Board came to be more impressed with the types and layouts of SC information already being 
produced at the US plants, and Downie’s work at Eagley was replaced by US layouts and 
analysis under the guidance of Sterling Smith of SJH, who had installed this firm’s systems in 
Paisley. Harrison, Downie & Inglis were paid £3454 for their work between 1932 and 1934 
(UGD199, 1/8/11).  
 
It is recorded in the Finance Committee minutes that in September 1933, revision of the 
accounting arrangements at the Glasgow Head Office necessary for the incorporation of SC 
was being undertaken. Coats had decided not to integrate SC and associated variances formally 
into its financial accounting system but instead planned to make maximum use of SC on a 
memorandum basis. In 1932 Sterling Smith was heavily involved at the Paisley, English and 
European plants and needed to have his contract extended, indicating progress at these mills.  
 
At the same time, Coats embarked on other MA changes. Mr McKeggie, a senior financial 
accounting official in Glasgow, was collecting information on the use of budgets in England, 
from Unilever, Dunlop and ICI, as well as in the USA. By 1934, the new SC system was 
beginning to reap benefits, and six members of the cost staff were deemed surplus to 
21 
 
requirement (UGD199, 1/1/24: 16 October 1934). Coats planned to stop using Stevens and 
Company and SJH by the end of 1935 (UGD199, 1/1/24). 
 
Throughout the period of installation, reports of the Cost Sub-Committee to the Finance 
Committee on the progress of the installation were furnished twice yearly, each approved 
without comment. By March 1935, expenditure to date on SC amounted to £65,543, which 
included £22,351 relating to the setting up of physical (time) standards. The figure included 
the time of all Coats staff involved in the installation, as well as the charges of the consultants 
involved (UGD199, 1/1/24).  
 
The minutes do not provide a complete picture, however, and Willie Mathieson’s passport 
shows his working all over Europe before the outbreak of World War Two, utilising his 
growing skills in the German language. In addition to Austria, he installed systems at mills in 
Czechoslovakia, Romania and Poland, as well as having part-time involvements in Germany, 
Switzerland, Yugoslavia and Hungary. His work in Germany and Austria was significantly 
helped by the presence of several highly competent local staff, who, with the help of Mathieson 
and Sterling Smith of SJH (whose services were in fact retained throughout the 1930s), were 
quickly able to take local responsibility (Mathieson 3).  
 
By 1940, the total cost of installing SC was recorded at £129,375, a large sum but one which 
pales into insignificance against annual profits of some £3m (UGD199, 1/8/11). Work on SC 
resumed again after World War Two with the Costing Committee responsible for overseeing 




Surviving documentation (Mathieson 1, 2 and 3) shows that the SC system changed very little 
over its life, the one main exception being its use for purposes of replacement cost accounting 




Hunter concluded from his interviews of directors and senior managers that, of all the changes 
to management, including the five new groupings of operations and the expanded committee 
system, it was in costing that ‘the most radical and successful changes were made’ (Hunter nd, 
41). SC eliminated the chronic late provision of costs and the updating of actual figures that 
had held the firm back for so long by calculating them at standard, then updating to actual by 
measuring aggregate percentage differences. The success of these changes was also attested to 
independently by Mathieson (3), by Coats (2013) and de facto in the perpetuation of the SC 
system from its inception to the end of the period of study. The pro-forma SC system 
documentation which survives is also testament to the system’s thoroughness and 
comprehensiveness (Mathieson 1). 
 
SC also speeded up the valuation of stocks for cost of sales and profit calculations. In addition, 
financial forecasts in Glasgow could be produced more frequently than had been achievable in 
the past, using figures needed for SC. Hunter also noted the increase in financial awareness 
that was improving decision making, especially concerning the crucial relationship of fixed 
and variable cost, with its implications for capacity utilisation. Also achieved was the ability 
of mill managers to regularly see, periodically, what the variances from standard were for direct 
costs and overheads, so that the reasons could be found and controllable costs reduced (Hunter 
nd, Mathieson 3). 
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Hunter states that SC did not fulfil all that was hoped of it. It did not resolve the problems of 
fairly allocating the sales and administration expenses of TCA nor of the Glasgow Head Office 
to products. It was decided to allocate these on the basis of turnover and to charge 50 per cent 
more overhead for handicraft products for which demand was less stable. The system, however, 
succeeded in the control of the vastly greater manufacturing costs.  
 
Accurate costing was especially important and necessary in the 1930s given volatile cotton 
prices worldwide, tariffs and quotas associated with Britain’s abandonment of the Gold 
Standard in 1931 and the generally recessionary environment of the times. SC was helpful in 
setting appropriate selling prices and in decisions regarding manning levels in the UK plants. 
It also revealed the comparative costs of production in different plants in the USA and Europe 
which led to decisions to rationalise and shift production, devices which proved useful 
throughout the period of the study (Hunter nd). 
 
An institutional interpretation of the progress of SC at Coats 
 
Burns and Scapens state that institutionally-based costing research ‘needs to be longitudinal in 
nature, in order to recognise the diachronic character of the processes of institutionalisation 
and the ongoing, cumulative nature of …[such]… processes’  (2000, 23). We therefore proceed 
in a chronological manner in order to examine the forces at work.  In particular, we test the 
tenet of Burns and Scapens that ‘management accounting change that is consistent with … 
existing routines and institutions will be easier to achieve than change which challenges those 
routines and institutions’, (2000, 12). We also bring in the role of wider, societal institutions 




These authors also note that institutions ‘exist at the cognitive level of individuals’ (ter Bogt 
and Scapens 2014, 16). They point out that the existence of institutions often needs to be 
inferred from discussions with those involved. As a result, while much of our evidence is based 
directly on the conversations of one of the authors (Ken Mathieson) with Willie Mathieson 
(Mathieson 3) or indirectly on discussions held by Hunter with senior actors from the period, 
(see ‘Sources’, above), this inevitably involves interpretation, as do other aspects of the 
institutional approach advocated by Burns and Scapens (2000) and ter Bogt and Scapens 
(2014), which we examine in the following sub-sections below.  
 
Power, external and internal institutions in the USA  
 
Burns and Scapens point out that formal MA change usually occurs ‘through the actions of a 
powerful individual or group’ (2000, 18), which, at Coats, in the case of SC, was initially the 
USA board. The US management of Coats, already partly independent from Glasgow given its 
size, distance and the need for local co-ordination of its large, mostly USA-based businesses, 
had become subject to an external institution of the US government, the Consent Decree of 
1914, enacted to enforce fair trade and bear down on trusts, and which allowed government 
examination of books without warning (Hunter nd). Combined with these business factors, it 
increased a sense of the firm belonging to the USA although owned in the UK, influencing the 
internal, institutional ‘logics’ of management in its feelings of power and independence (ter 
Bogt and Scapens 2014, 6).  
  
The introduction of SC within Coats began in 1925 in its US plants, which thus felt confident 
enough to introduce it on their own. In response to the rapidly growing US economy, there had 
grown up by 1925, over three decades, a number of consultancy firms, including that of FW 
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Taylor, which offered to businesses new ‘scientific’ management processes which included 
work study and SC. The cluster of management firms thus created, many led by cost 
accountants, may be considered to constitute an informal external ‘institution’, containing its 
own ‘forms of rationality’ (ter Bogt and Scapens 2014, 13), in particular the primacy of 
financial discipline. In the absence of surviving evidence, we can only speculate that 
isomorphism, or emulation, may have influenced Coats in the USA to adopt SC and 
institutionalise the same ‘situated logic’ in its US operations (ter Bogt and Scapens 2014, 6).  
 
Power and institutions in the wider Coats Group 
 
However Hunter does make it clear that, as far as the Group HQ in Glasgow was concerned, 
‘several of the older directors were unconvinced of the need for change and sceptical of the 
new ideas’ implicit in SC’ (Hunter nd, 26).  Thus it is an example of the difficulties that, 
according to Burns and Scapens (2000), may be encountered in introducing a new form of 
management that does not conform with an organisation’s established ‘way of doing things’, 
even although past accounting practice had been proved conclusively in this case to be 
inadequate, as noted earlier. As Burns and Scapens interpret such events, (2000, 19), the 
objectors did not, over time, have ‘sufficient power’ and in the circumstances had failed. The 
successful pro-SC group on the main board, which instigated SC some four years after the 
USA, was led by the mathematically inclined CH MacKenzie, (Hunter nd). MacKenzie is likely 
to have visited the US plants, or at least, to have become increasingly aware of their uptake of 
SC at some point during the late-1920s. 
 
One group which also had institutional power, and exercised it, was the Coats’ Bookkeeping 
department in Glasgow, which initially was more influential with the Board than the Costing 
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department (Mathieson 3). Ostensibly concerned that the new system, based on standard or 
notional costs rather than actual, should not be allowed to form part of the accounting system, 
the Bookkeeping department ensured that SC was kept on a memorandum basis, requiring 
regular reconciliations of standard to actual. However, as the new system settled in and proved 
its usefulness, the Costing staff became more influential than Bookkeeping, a facet of the new 
system’s gradual ‘institutionalisation’ at the group level (Mathieson 3). 
 
Further, the SC system was put into plants in a manner consistent with other ‘existing routines’ 
at Coats. Since the earliest years of the limited company, it had been general practice in Coats 
to send home mills staff at all appropriate levels abroad to install new machinery, new systems 
or production processes, which happened in the case of SC. This mixing of staff usually led to 
long-term transnational goodwill, together with a certain amount of cultural transfer, for 
example in the area of football, which was introduced into the Brazilian plants by Scottish 
workers in the 1910s (Coats 2013). Friendships made beyond Scotland in the installation of SC 
helped legitimate and smooth its progress across the group for decades to come (Mathieson 3). 
 
The mixed local and Scottish installation teams were augmented by consultants. Stevens and 
Company of Boston took the lead in the area of work measurement with the installation of the 
SC system itself initially (in the UK) led both by Downie and then SJH’s Sterling Smith. Good 
working relations across each team reduced the degree of unfamiliarity that might have arisen 
had external consultants alone been used (Mathieson 3). 
 
Moreover, it had long been a ‘settled habit of thought and action’ at Coats to ensure that UK 
expatriate staff had a knowledge of the local language used in overseas plants (Burns and 
Scapens 2000, 6). As noted, staff preparing for overseas SC installation undertook language 
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training where necessary. This effort was favourably interpreted locally, contributing to good 
relations and ease of communication, which facilitated the introduction and acceptance of SC. 
These ‘ways of doing things’ are traced by Coats (2013) to the firm’s building of a new thread 
mill at Torello in Spain, completed after many delays in 1896. It emphasised the importance of 
learning the local language and deferring to local beliefs and values when moving in: Coats 
were persuaded to build a new Catholic Church next to the mill to help overcome local 
resistance to working for non-Catholic foremen sent from Paisley. Out of respect for Spain’s 
collective and family values, a range of recreational and communal facilities was also added 
(Coats 2013, 210-211). Coats’ care in these areas led to its large cadre of expatriate staff being 
referred to as the ‘Scottish Diplomatic Service’ because of the ‘multiplicity of languages and 
cultures’ to which they could adapt with ease (Coats 2013, 386). Ventures of this nature are a 
major example of external institutions (the customs, language and values of host countries) 
influencing Coats’ institutionalised values and practices (ter Bogt and Scapens 2014). 
 
Also important was Coats’ traditional thoroughness in management training. For some 
decades, it had been the practice at Coats to train future executives in all the firm’s key 
departments. In the case of SC, a training manual was produced at the early stages of its 
adoption.  Every trainee had to undergo a course in the nature, detail, purpose and use of the 
SC system, including the accounting treatment of key figures.  
 
As seen in the surviving 1960s update of this training manual, it was no broad appreciation 
course, but a guide to all the major steps in building up costs, which encompassed a full 
understanding of the nature and cost treatment of overheads, including their allocation and 
apportionment to mill processes. Further, trainees were given an understanding of the overhead 
allocations which affected the departments in which they were to be engaged, thus being 
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prepared for senior office in posts which required the handling of costs for management, 
financial or pricing purposes. Burns and Scapens (2000) characterise the procedures contained 
in such manuals as organisational ‘rules’ which quickly become institutionalised. 
 
Moreover, the system of cost reporting implemented was harmonised with the three-month, 
six-month and annual reporting cycles already in existence before its implementation, utilising 
a pattern that was well established and more readily acceptable to reporting staff in the plants 
than one which was not. All of the above ‘routines and institutions’ played a part in the 
successful implementation of SC, confirming Burns and Scapens contention that MA change 
that is accomplished through existing institutions and practices is more likely to succeed (Burns 
and Scapens 2000, 12). 
 
Institutionalisation and the effects of unintended consequences 
 
Burns and Scapens (2000) make frequent reference in their paper to the ‘unintended 
consequences’ that can result from MA change. Hunter states, based on interviews of those 
concerned, that ‘this [i.e. SC] … increased the American side’s feelings of ‘apartness’ from 
Glasgow’ (Hunter nd, 29). It is clear that it was also intended to signify that SC gave the USA 
operations management an unprecedented, detailed knowledge of their business that enabled 
them to understand its dynamics better, giving them a feeling of control that they knew the rest 
of Coats could not have had, even as late as 1930. Hunter also stated that this feeling of 
‘apartness’ also brought with it the sobering but salutary knowledge that ‘the still almost totally 
and jealously separate operation of the Coats and Clark manufacturing assets in the USA was 
increasingly doubtful on economic grounds’, which had been discovered through comparative 
costings created as a result of SC (Hunter nd, 29). It would lead in due course to major shake-
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ups and relocations of the USA operations: all of the foregoing massive unintended 
consequences in terms of human feelings of independence, growth in technical knowledge and 
strategic directional change as a result of the USA ‘experiment’ with SC (Hunter nd, 28). 
 
As the main body of Coats plants implemented SC from the early 1930s, feelings of control, 
independence and growing financial awareness of one’s own operation became the common 
experience (Hunter nd; Mathieson 3). Judging by the evidence from the Costing Committee 
Minutes of 1928-1930 presented earlier (UGD199, 1/1/24), even though there was growing 
pressure from within the Coats group for a degree of managerial autonomy inside the 
company’s plants, the recorded reasons for the introduction of SC were accounting and 
financial ones related to the slowness and paucity of information. It is perhaps significant that 
SC was initiated across the Coats group almost a year in advance of the restructuring that 
brought a measure of devolution, suggesting that the feelings of control and responsibility that 
did emerge were unintended consequences. It is congruent with the contention of Burns and 
Scapens (2000) that, once a sense of local control and financial accountability emerged at the 
plant level after SC was up and running, it was likely to become institutionalised, supplanting 
an institutionalised outlook that ‘was essentially that of very skilled mechanics rather than that 
of entrepreneurs’ (Hunter nd, 21). 
 
There were further unintended consequences associated with SC. One of these can be aligned 
with Veblen’s notion of ‘idle curiosity’, cited by Burns and Scapens (2000, 18), the human 
tendency to experimentation and innovation which arises at times when there is a settled pattern 
of behaviour and which leads to innovative thinking. The most significant example was the 
development of a viable system of current cost accounting (CCA) at Coats during the years of 
World War Two.  
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Its invention grew out of the SC system, which processed stock movements at both actual and 
SC.  Additionally, it enabled the calculation of monthly ratios of actual costs to SC, such that 
product costs and stocks valued at standard could be adjusted to actual level. It was noticed 
during the War that some of the ratios already produced could also be used to update SC to 
CCA for pricing and costing of government contracts. It remained useful for pricing in the 
period of inflation post-World War Two. Although it was the sole application of what the firm 
designated ‘current cost accounting’ (Mathieson 3), it put Coats in a leading position, as 
theoretical debate on CCA did not gain momentum in the international accounting literature 
until the 1960s (Deegan and Unerman 2011). This innovation shows how unintended 
consequences of the new SC system became routinised and institutionalised. 
 
As demonstrated, the successful installation of SC at J&P Coats may be seen and explained 
with reference to the various tenets of institutional theory, lending credibility to the view that 
successful MA change is more likely to be achieved if it is introduced with due attention paid 
to the existing institutions and routines within organisations. Even so, as was shown, external 
institutions also contributed to internal ones. 
 
Insights on the development of SC in the UK  
 
The previous chronicle has enabled us to attach some dates to the outlined events which add to 
what is understood about the implementation of SC in the UK. SC at Coats was in the 
development process since the end of 1930, the largest firm to date in the UK and at that point 
possibly in the world adopting it, making it the ninth firm in the UK known to have adopted it 
(using Boyns and Edwards’ 2013 listing sans Coats as a guideline). Coats was also an early 
example of a very large UK firm adopting it, as opposed to the medium-sized firms generally 
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doing so (Boyns and Edwards 2007).  Boyns and Edwards (2007, 971) discuss the differences 
between the implementation of SC in the USA and the UK, stating they would be surprised if 
there were ‘no important variations in the historical development of accounting in the two countries’, 
not least because of their relative size (Boyns and Edwards 2007, 973). Our analysis provides support 
for the view that SC was further developed in the USA than the UK (Chatfield 1977; Locke 
1979) and that consultants were deeply involved in its development, exporting their services to 
the UK. It also suggests that, where a large firm adopting SC had branches both in the USA 
and the UK, a tendency would exist for the SC systems adopted to be the same, but more 
research is needed to confirm this argument.  
 
Not adopting the same system of SC across its branches would have prevented Coats from 
acquiring a uniform system of SC ‘enabling company management to compare the results of 
different internal operations’ in factories producing the same products (Boyns and Edwards 
2007, 990).  It also would decrease other benefits of co-ordination and control posited as early 
as the 1920s (Blyth 1923) as Coats indeed did. Our research also reinforces the argument that 
SC and budgetary control did not develop together (Boyns and Edwards 2007; Edwards 1937; 
1CAEW 1947), although they developed separately at much the same time in Coats, an 
important insight that cautions against future linking of the two techniques at this period in the 
history of costing. 
 
In considering change agents, the simple fact is that Coats did what a number of firms 
apparently did (Boyns and Edwards 2007) and approached its auditors for advice on who could 
help it with the task. So, Coats initiated the change, helped by advice from its auditors in the 
first instance. However as was shown earlier, once started on the installation work, Downie’s 
position as auditor of parts of the combine was to debar him from continuing it. Coats’ US 
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consultants, SJH, who had done the installation work for the firm in 1925 in the US plants, 
were then invited take over the job and the role of change agents for the group. The senior 
installation costing staff at Coats, who worked in conjunction with consultants for the first 
decade, then became the change agents.  
 
Regarding the degree of integration of SC into the double-entry financial system, Brown 
(1949), quoted in Boyns and Edwards (2007, 986) provides five ‘phases’ assumed to be gone 
through by firms on the road to full integration of costing into their financial accounting 
systems. This integration never happened at Coats, where the old costing system and new SC 
system which followed it in the 1930s were ‘kept separate but capable of being reconciled’ 
(Brown 1949, Phase 3), due to the dominance of the financial accounting staff and their 
ostensible suspicion of notional figures, as explained earlier, partly, it would appear, to preserve 
their power.  
 
Similarly, the non-integration of budgetary control with SC at Coats as illustrated may owe its 
separateness to the power of the Financial Accounting Group, whose Mr McKeggie took the 
lead in researching its introduction. This view fits with the findings of the ICAEW, which noted 
in a 1947 report quoted in Boyns and Edwards (2007, 990) that ‘Budgeting and Standard 
Costing evolved independently but contemporaneously’. While the entrenched power of 
financial accounting at Coats might have been a factor, more evidence is needed. 
 
Boyns and Edwards observe that marginal costing and associated awareness of the behaviour 
of fixed costs were in evidence from the eighteenth century (2007, 1019; Jones 1985). 
However, there was limited awareness of this at Coats until SC was introduced (Mathieson, 3). 
As noted, SC gave the Coats managing committees a clear assessment of the effects of volume 
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fluctuations in production and better enabled variances to be separated into ‘controllable’ and 
‘non-controllable’. It may well be that this was a general effect of the introduction of SC across 
the UK. 
 
Also, ‘responsibility accounting’ for departmental targets is associated by some writers with 
the widespread adoption of SC and budgetary control in the 1950s and 1960s (Boyns and 
Edwards 2007, 1016). Our results also note a marked increase in managerial financial 
awareness and competence at Coats to the introduction of SC, although it occurred from the 
1925 onwards, giving earlier evidence that the one is likely to produce the other. 
 
Additionally Boyns and Edwards (2007) discuss the findings of Alfred D Chandler, who 
asserted that the supposed and more rapid development of the M-form company in the USA 
was closely related to faster progress in the development of MA in the USA. Boyns and 
Edwards note that, in The Visible Hand (1977), Chandler suggests that devolved costing 
facilities enabled the largely localised control of divisions, loosely overseen by a small, head 
office staff. This argument has some resonance with the Coats case. While Coats was run by a 
system of Head Office committees, rather than a central board backed up by small, functional 
departments, such departments did exist for co-ordinating purposes.  Thus, as the Coats case 
shows, it could work in firms other than those structured in M-form. 
 
While the foregoing locates Coats in the wider picture of adoption of SC and budgetary control 
in the UK, it also suggests that a number of more ostensibly technical issues, such as the 
integration (or not) of SC into Financial Accounting systems within firms, and the 
implementation of SC at the same time as budgetary control (or not), may well be political 
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decisions relating to the balance of power, established institutions and routines within firms. 




This study set out to accomplish a number of objectives, the first of which was to provide a 
history of the implementation of SC at J&P Coats, then to analyse it from an institutional point 
of view, using the Burns and Scapens (2000) and ter Bogt and Scapens (2014) framework. As 
shown above, the study has benefited from these research insights examining the effects of 
both internal and external institutions on the development of the varied forms of logic (‘situated 
logics’) to which they gave rise and their roles in SC implementation. At various points, it has 
also highlights the power of existing practices/institutions to effect change, as Burns and 
Scapens (2000) suggest. Further, our analysis demonstrates that the examination of both 
external and internal institutions, and their interaction, provides a richer, more comprehensive 
picture of organisational behaviour in the area of MA and SC implementation.  
 
A summary of how SC was implemented across Coats, from an institutional point of view, 
would first emphasise external institutional influences on the US operation by 1925 (both legal 
and in the area of  ‘Scientific Management’).  The latter eventually contributed to, by the late-
1920s, the dominance of the pro-SC view on the Coats Glasgow board. This dominance 
resulted in the issuance of group SC implementation instructions from the Glasgow Head 
Office and the harmonisation of reporting dates with existing ones, the latter all already 




Further, the external influence of overseas cultures on Coats’ own processes for the 
implementation of change in overseas plants was already well institutionalised in its dealings 
with overseas employees. This institutionalisation eased SC’s introduction through deference 
to local language, values and full involvement of local staff. 
 
Additionally, the rigorous training of Coats management came to incorporate the study of a 
full SC training manual which ensured the institutionalisation and dissemination of the new 
routines. The unintended consequence of acceptance of ‘responsibility accounting’ at plants 
was a sense of separation and autonomy from the centre, brought about through the forecasting 
and reporting requirements of the new system.  While this was not well enough understood at 
the time to be foreseen, it did bring about improvements to management which were widely 
unplanned but beneficial.  SC helped produce what Coats (2013) has called ‘a series of 
articulate, self-confident and numerate managers’ (Coats 2013, 386), financial awareness thus 
becoming the dominant ‘situated logic’ throughout the firm’s management, displacing the 
Coats engineering ethos that had formerly prevailed. Our analysis also emphasises the 
fluctuating importance of power groupings within the firm, and the influence that these 
individuals eventually came to have on SC implementation at Coats. 
 
At the outset, we sought to contribute to the literature examining how an institutional approach 
could be useful to historians. The retrospective view of institutionally related changes afforded 
by this case study helps to explain the implementation and use of SC at Coats for the years 
studied. It has highlighted the ebb and flow of human influence, human thought and human 
practice in developing MA successfully across a major firm over an extended period of time. 




Moreover we have located the chronology of the Coats case within the general history of SC 
development in the UK, as presented by Boyns and Edwards (2007 and 2013). While the basic 
facts of the chronology of SC or MA change across entire industries and economies is of 
interest, the Coats case suggests that a knowledge of the institutional factors at work in firms, 
taken in aggregate, could also help us understand sectoral developments more widely. Yet this 
would only be possible if more historical case study research into the installation of SC in the 
UK informed by an institutional perspective were undertaken, contingent upon the availability 
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